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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBSCENITY-TIIE EVOLVING DEFINITION
OF OBSCENITY.
People v. Richmond County News, Inc. (N.Y. 1961).
Monfred v. State, (Md. 1961).
In People v. Richmond County News, Inc., defendant was convicted
of the sale and distribution of obscene books and articles1 under the
New York obscenity statute.2 In the Appellate Division, defendant raised
the problem of scienter under the New York statute and won a reversal.3
The state thereupon appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which
did not treat the scienter issue but affirmed the reversal of defendant's
conviction, with three judges dissenting, holding that the New York
statute ". . . should apply only to what may properly be termed 'hard
core pornography.' "4 The court concluded that the magazine sold by
defendant was not "hard core pornography." People v. Richmond County
News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
In Monfred v. State, the defendants were tried under a similar
obscenity statute.5 Defendants contended that the statute applied only to
"hard core pornography," that their magazines were not of that class.
and that therefore they were not guilty under the statute' (citing, inter
alia, People v. Richmond County News, Inc.). The trial court, sitting
without a jury, applied the test set forth in Roth v. United States6 and
found the defendants guilty. On appeal, the Maryland Supreme Court
expressed its approval of the Roth test, but decided that one of the six
magazines involved was not obscene under the test and reversed the con-
victions based on the sale of that magazine, while affirming the others.
The court, with one judge dissenting, held that ". . . magazines presenting
pictures of nude or semi-nude women interspersed with pointedly sug-
gestive sex stories were obscene within the meaning of the state obscenity
statute and within the power of the state to censor obscene matter." 7
Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312, 173 A.2d 173 (1961).
1. The prosecution was for distribution of a magazine which the court said was
"similar to that of numerous other magazines which loudly proclaim their dedication
to course sensuality." People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9N.Y.2d 578, 175
N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
2. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1141 makes it a misdemeanor for any person to "sell . . .
or have in his possession with intent to sell . . . any obscene, lewd . . . book,
magazine or image."
3. 205 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 1960).
4. People v. Richmond County News, Inc.. 9 N.Y.2d 578, 586, 175 N.E.2d 681,
685, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 375 (1961).
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 418 Supp. 1957, makes it a misdemeanor for any
person to "Knowingly ... sell . . . any lewd, obscene, or indecent book, magazine ...
drawing or photograph."
6. 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957); for the test, see text accompanying
note 8 infra.
7. Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312, 173 A.2d 173 (1961).
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In holding, in Roth v. United States,8 that obscenity is not within the
protection of the first amendment the Supreme Court, after repudiating the
so-called Hicklin° test, attempted to establish a workable test of what con-
stitutes obscenity, which is ". . . whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."' 0 Since the first amend-
ment's guarantees of free expression are also applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause,' l the Supreme
Court's definition of obscenity in Roth is, to the extent that it states a
constitutional limitation on the kinds of material that may be suppressed as
obscene, binding on the state courts. However, it remains for the states to
interpret and apply this rather abstract test to specific literary materials
as they believe the Supreme Court meant it to be interpreted and applied.
In the instant cases, New York and Maryland recognized this problem
and reacted differently to it, thus indicating that Roth's definition may not
be as simple as it appears on it face. Both state courts properly proceeded
first to determine what their state statute meant to include in the category of
obscenity, and then whether Roth would permit such an inclusion.
The New York court, in the Richmond County case, felt that Roth
was only suggestive of the permissible broad boundaries within which
publications could constitutionally be proscribed as obscene, 12 and de-
clined to construe the New York obscenity statute so as to suppress all
the literature which could be included under a broad interpretation of
the Roth test. After an historical review of obscenity law, the court con-
cluded that the New York statute was meant to include only so-called
"hard core pornography.' 3 The concurring opinion of Judge Fuld ap-
provingly adopts the Roth test but concludes that it was meant to include
only "hard core pornography" anyway.' 4 In pointing up a weakness in
the majority's argument, the dissenting opinion suggests that the majority
adopts a far more stringent test than is required under Roth, and asks:
8. 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957).
9. Regina v. Hicklin, 1868 3 Q.B. 360, 371. The Hicklin test, almost univer-
sally accepted at one time was ". . . whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." This test
was properly criticized and finally overruled in Roth because under it: (1) any
part of a work taken out of context could be used to declare the entire work obscene;
and (2) the tendency of the work to influence adolescents or others abnormally
susceptible was the test of obscenity.
10. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
11. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931) ; Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925).
12. Supra note 1, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 586, 175 N.E.2d at 685, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
13. The court defines "hard core pornography" by description and example
rather than generally. "It focuses predominantly upon what is sexually morbid,
grossly perverse and bizarre, without any %artistic or scientific purpose or justifica-
tion. Depicting dirt for dirt's sake, the obscene is the vile, rather than the coarse,
the blow to sense, not merely to sensibility. It smacks, at times, of fantasy and
unreality, of sexual perversion and sickness . . ." People v. Richmond County News,
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681, 686, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 377 (1961).
14. Supra note 1, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 589, 175 N.E.2d at 687, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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"Why is it necessary for us to strain against the definition laid down by
the highest court in the land, in order tO permit the continued distribution
of material which the average person would unhesitatingly condemn as
obscene and lewd ?" 5
The Maryland court, on the other hand, felt bound by the Roth
test' 6 and interpreted its statute as broadly as permitted by that test,
thus including not only "hard core pornography" but also that
area on the periphery of "hard core pornography" which it felt would
be considered obscene by Roth's "average person applying contemporary
community standards."
For purposes of analysis, it is possible to distinguish four classes of
literature: (1) "hard core pornography," which is unquestionably in-
cluded in any definition of obscenity; (2) that material on the periphery
of "hard core pornography," which is the vague area of obscenity under
current standards ;17 (3) that material which is not obscene for adults
but may be denied to minors ;18 (4) that material which clearly is not
obscene for anyone. The fundamental problem is whether or not to
include the material in class (2) within the scope of censorable obscenity.
The Roth test on its face would seem to be open to two opposite inter-
pretations: first, that class (1) and class (2) materials are included in
the definition of obscenity (the interpretation accepted by the Maryland
court in the Monfred case) ; second, that only class (1) materials are so
included. Only when the Supreme Court itself is squarely presented with
the issue as to which of the above interpretations to adopt will there be
a definite answer to this enigma.
The advocates of more strict censorship laws, of course, have at-
tempted to show the harm done to the community by literature of the
class (2) type and thus the catastrophe which would result if the Supreme
Court fails to include literature of that type in its definition.1 9 On the
other hand, advocates of complete free speech with minimal restriction,
will point to the infringement of the minority's rights of freedom of
speech and press. 20 The final determination of this problem is not yet
in sight. Since the Roth case in 1957, the Supreme Court in four per
15. Supra note 1, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 591, 175 N.E.2d at 689, 216 N.Y.S.Zd at 380.
16. The court emphatically points this out: "But, until the Supreme Court
specifically speaks further in this uncertain area, we think we are bound by what
we understand the Roth test requires." Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312, 173 A.2d
173, 178 (1961).
17. See Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MiNN. L. Rv. 5 (1960). This article deals with the
Roth decision and speculates as to what the eventual standard may be.
18. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 77 S. Ct. 524 (1957), differentiates be-
tween material fit for adults and that fit for youths, holding that a state obscenity
standard cannot limit the reading matter available to adults to that fit only for
children.
19. The dissent in People v. Richmond County NeWs, Inc., supra note 1, would
align itself with this faction.
20. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black in their many dissents in the
free speech cases urge this view. See the dissent by Justice Douglas in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1321 (1957).
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curiam decisions2 ' has failed to further clarify the test laid down in that
decision. In these cases, involving materials that the lower federal courts
had found to be clearly obscene under the Roth test, the Supreme Court
reversed without opinion, citing Roth. Although no final conclusions can
be drawn on so limited a basis, this would seem to be some indication that
the Supreme Court is moving in the direction of limiting the obscenity
test to "hard core pornography" and thus excluding the peripheral
area. 22 The dissenting judge in State v. Monfred (like Judge Fuld in
the New York case), after an analysis of these cases, also comes to this
conclusion. 23 Thus, although there may be a visceral tendency to align
with the majority decision of the Maryland court and include both
class (1) and class (2) materials in obscenity, the New York court ap-
pears to have more nearly aligned itself with the position indicated by the
Supreme Court's per curiam decisions in deciding to exclude literature
of the class (2) type from its obscenity definition (although, as in-
dicated above, it has done so on the basis of statutory interpretation).
It is generally agreed that "hard core pornography" is obscene and
should be suppressed. If this is accepted as a premise the logical next
step is to inquire into the reasons underlying this general policy. Probably
the most basic policy reason for the suppression of pornography is its
tendency to harm mentally and emotionally those persons not mature
enough to avoid it. Realistically, it is necessary to bear in mind the
difficulty in distinguishing between class (1) and class (2) literature. The
distinction drawn between these classes, while analytically useful, is a
very tenuous one in reality. Both classes include repeated detailed
descriptions of wildly exaggerated, fantasy-like, erotic, adventures de-
scribed in the frankest imaginable language. The only practical difference
between class (1) and class (2) materials seems to be the total absence
of any redeeming social value in the "hard core" publications as against
the barest possible minimum 2 4 of such compensating value in the
peripheral literature (possibly inserted for the very purpose of removing
it- from the "hard core pornography" category, thus bringing it within the
law). If the social harm caused by the "hard core pornography" is due to
its "dirtiness," it is difficult to see how less harm can come from litera-
ture which may be just as "dirty." Since the harm which it can cause is
the essential reason for suppression of "hard core pornography," there
21. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371, 78 S. Ct. 364 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d
772 (9 Cir. 1957); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372, 78 S. Ct.
365 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, 78 S. Ct. 115 (1957), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7 Cir.
1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180, 78 S. Ct. 267 (9 Cir. 1957), re-
versing 247 F.2d 148 (1957).
22. See Lockhart and McClure, note 17 supra.
23. Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312, 173 A.2d 173, 186 (1961).
24. In his dissent in People v. Richmond County News, Inc, 175 N.E.2d 681,
690 (1961), Judge Frossel, after illustrating the generally salacious content of
the magazine involved, points out that, ... "there is some mild attempt at face
saving by the inclusion of some material that is free from smut."
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would seem to be no valid reason for excluding literature of the peripheral
type from that to be suppressed as obscene. If the harmful qualities are
present in both, it would seem that both should be treated alike.
The Supreme Court has said many times that the rights of free
speech and press are not absolute, and that obscenity is not constitutionally
protected. 25 The Roth test certainly is susceptible to the interpretation
that obscenity is to include not only "hard core pornography" but the
peripheral material also. If "hard core pornography" is not constitu-
tionally protected because of its harmful effects, the question remains why
should materials which are difficult to distinguish from "hard core
pornography" and equally as harmful as it, be shielded by the Constitution.
Is there a significant enough difference between class (1) and class (2)
literature to warrant outlawing the former and yet allowing the latter the
protection of the law? If the Supreme Court is leaning towards restric-
tion of the test to "hard core pornography" only, it would seem that
strong policy reasons do not favor that interpretation, and that under the
present Roth test, the "average person applying contemporary community
standards" would also proscribe such peripheral literature.
Any final determination of the obscenity problem must involve
balancing the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and of
the press against the possibility of serious social harm which the works
in question may cause. Of course, it must always be remembered that
it is not what the majority wants to read and hear that primarily must
be protected by the Constitution; the majority's rights rarely require
constitutional protection. It is the right to hold and express a minority
opinion which primarily needs the protection of the law. But, if the
publications attempted to be circulated would cause serious harm to
the community, out of proportion to the individual's right of free ex-
pression, legal protection of the community's welfare would seem both
permissible and necessary.
In conclusion, the one certain statement that can be made about the
developing definition of obscenity is that it is yet unclear just what it en-
compasses. This case note proposes that it include at least (class 1) hard
core pornography and that portion of (class 2) the peripheral literature
in which the harmful effects clearly outweigh any social value the work
may contain.
Michael R. Bradley
25. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. .568, 571, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766,
768, 769 (1942), where the court said ". . . the right of free speech is not abso-
lute ... There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . ." [Emphasis added].
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